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Section 1 
Introduction 
Since March 2017, a new income-related housing support for those with a long-term 
housing need called Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) has been available throughout 
the state. This support forms an integral part of the government’s ‘Rebuilding Ireland’ 
housing strategy, with over 60% of the almost 140,000 additional households to receive 
social housing over the period 2016-2021 to do so through HAP. The government 
intends that HAP will become the primary income-related housing support for those in 
the private rental sector, replacing Rent Supplement – currently the main such support 
– for existing long-term claimants over the coming years.1  
 
This paper examines the potential impact on financial work incentives of transferring 
long-run Rent Supplement recipients onto HAP. It uses representative household survey 
data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) along with SWITCH – 
the ESRI’s tax and benefit microsimulation model – to calculate summary measures of 
the financial incentive to work full-time. We compare these under the existing system 
and a variant of HAP where tenants’ rental contributions are determined by a system of 
‘National Differential Rents’, as proposed by the Housing Agency (Carroll, 2014).  
 
We find that introducing such a system would strengthen the financial incentive for 
long-term Rent Supplement claimants to be in full-time paid work, with just over half 
gaining by an average of €2,084 per year and two-fifths losing by an average of €568 
per year. We estimate that the proposed scheme would increase the entitlements of this 
group by about €25 million per year, in part for the same reasons as it would improve 
financial work incentives: the elimination of Rent Supplement’s restriction on working 
more than 30 hours per week, and the lower rate at which the HAP payment would be 
withdrawn against income.  
                                                 
1 See ‘Rebuilding Ireland: Progress against targets’ at https://www.housing.gov.ie/housing/social-
housing/social-and-affordble/overall-social-housing-provision and ‘Rebuilding Ireland: Action Plan for 
Housing and Homelessness’ at http://rebuildingireland.ie/Rebuilding%20Ireland_Action%20Plan.pdf   
 -3- 
 
However, a small minority of existing claimants would continue to face weak work 
incentives even after being transferred from Rent Supplement. This is driven by the 
receipt of other means-tested benefits in addition to income-related housing supports; 
in particular, jobseekers allowance and one-parent family payment. The simultaneous 
withdrawal of multiple means-tested benefits means some low-income individuals can 
face very high effective marginal tax rates from relatively low levels of earnings, and 
demonstrates the importance of considering the tax and benefit system as a whole. The 
effect of changes to the design of income-related supports for housing costs is mediated 
by other elements of the system, all of which should be considered when analysing the 
effect of policy changes on incomes, work incentives or behaviour. 
 
Finally, while this paper shows that HAP has the potential to improve financial work 
incentives for existing long-term recipients of Rent Supplement, it is important to note 
that we have considered a variant of HAP where tenants’ rent contributions are 
determined by a hypothetical ‘National Differential Rents’ scheme. Although such a 
unified national scheme was planned when work on this report commenced, rental 
contributions under HAP are currently determined by county or city council’s 
Differential Rent scheme, also used to calculate the rental contributions of local 
authority tenants. These differ in terms of minimum (and maximum) contributions, 
definitions of means-testable income, and the rate at which contributions increase with 
this income.2 As a result, the actual effects of HAP on financial work incentives may 
differ from those described here, and will vary across local authorities.    
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out key features of the 
existing structure of income-related housing support. Section 3 describes the data used 
in the study; a pooled sample of 2013 and 2014 waves of SILC. The way in which HAP 
is modelled in SWITCH is also discussed in this section. Section 4 reports results 
relating to costs, the pattern of gains and losses, and the impact on incentives to be in 
full time work. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
2 The government committed to reviewing ‘the disparate systems of Differential Rents for social housing 
across local authorities’ in its Rebuilding Ireland Action Plan, though this has yet to be published.  
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Section 2 
Income-related Housing Supports 
In this section, we briefly describe the main income-related housing supports available 
to those in the private rental market: Rent Supplement, the Rental Accommodation 
Scheme (RAS), and Housing Assistance Payment (HAP). 
 
Rent Supplement is an income supplement designed to support those in the private 
rented sector who are having difficulty meeting rent payments after a change in 
circumstances. Historically, this has been the main housing support available to low-
income tenants in the private rented sector. The amount of rent supplement paid 
depends on a number of factors, including household income and the rent paid for the 
property. Maximum rent limits apply, which vary by region and by household 
composition, but may be exceeded in exceptional circumstances at the discretion of a 
Community Welfare officer. 
 
Eligibility for Rent Supplement depends on a number of factors. Private renters must 
have lived in rented accommodation for at least 6 out of the last 12 months, or have 
been assessed by a local authority as being eligible for and in need of social housing in 
the last 12 months. In addition, applicants must pass a means test that takes into account 
employment income and most social welfare income. They must also work no more 
than 29 hours per week, which can create a strong disincentive to work full-time for 
individuals with low wages and high rental costs.3 
 
Table 1 shows that despite its intention as a short-run support, more than half of Rent 
Supplement claimants have been in receipt of the payment for at least a year since 2000. 
This proportion rose to a high of 75% in 2015.  
 
                                                 
3 An exception to this rule can be granted where an applicant has been out of full-time employment for 
over 12 months and has been assessed as in need of housing under the Rental Accommodation Scheme. 
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Table 1: Recipients of Rent Supplement Classified by Claim Duration -  
Months 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 % % % % % % %  
0 to 3 8.2 13.4 11.8 11.3 8.5 7.0 5.5 5.0 
3 to 6 15.3 14.8 15.0 13.6 11.6 10.9 8.4 7.0 
6 to 9 12.0 10.5 12.1 10.8 9.7 8.6 7.5 6.8 
9 to 12 9.6 8.5 10.9 9.5 8.1 7.5 6.9 6.2 
12 plus 54.8 52.8 50.1 54.7 62.0 65.9 71.7 75.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services, 2000 to 2015 
 
The Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS) was established to provide support for 
people with a long-term housing need, in particular those claiming Rent Supplement 
for 18 months or more. Unlike Rent Supplement, local authorities agree contracts with 
landlords to provide accommodation for households on their social housing waiting 
lists, and pay landlords directly. Tenants make a contribution towards their rent 
determined by the Differential Rent scheme operated by their local authority, that 
depends on household income, size and composition. 
 
The new Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) is similar to RAS except individuals, 
rather than local authorities, are responsible for sourcing and signing a tenancy 
agreement with landlords. The ‘Rebuilding Ireland Action Plan’ states that the 
Government’s intention is for HAP to eventually replace Rent Supplement and RAS 
for households with a long-term housing need.  
 
Payments are made directly to landlords on behalf of tenants, with tenants’ rental 
contribution calculated under their local authority’s Differential Rent scheme. While 
the precise details of how these contributions are calculated differ substantially across 
local authorities, they in general consist of a minimum payment that increase with 
income (up to a ceiling in many but not all local authorities). As with Rent Supplement, 
maximum rent limits – which vary by region and household composition – apply, 
though local authorities have discretion to exceed these by up to 20% (and more for 
claimants who are registered as homeless).   
  
Section 3 
Data Issues and Modelling of  
Income-Related Housing Supports 
In this Section we provide a broad description of the data available from the CSO 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions which underpins the modelling of tax and 
welfare policy options. We then consider the data issues relating specifically to Rent 
Supplement, comparing the numbers receiving this payment as recorded by the 
Department of Social Protection with the estimated numbers in receipt based on the 
CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions. In Section 3.3 we explain how 
SWITCH uses the information in SILC to model the main housing support payments in 
Ireland. 
 
3.1 SILC data and the SWITCH microsimulation model 
The Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) is an annual survey conducted by 
the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in order to obtain information regarding the income 
and living conditions of Irish households. It is the Irish component of an EU wide 
survey which aims to capture information on poverty and social exclusion across 
Europe. The survey is both cross-sectional and also has a panel dimension with certain 
households surveyed annually. The survey began in 2003. The SWITCH database was 
recently updated, and is currently based on a pooled sample of households from the 
2013 and 2014 waves of SILC.4 The SWITCH database contains almost 8,000 
households or over 20,000 individuals. Basing the model on SILC means that the model 
represents as fully as possible the great diversity of household circumstances relevant 
to tax and social welfare. Methods of updating and recalibrating the data to represent 
the next budgetary year have been developed, in line with practice in many other 
countries. 
 
                                                 
4 The sample of households used to construct the SWITCH database contains all households form the 
2014 survey, and all additional households from the 2013 survey that were not interviewed in the 2014 
survey. This ensures that households that were interviewed for both the 2013 and 2014 waves of SILC 
are present only once in the SWITCH database.  
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SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, simulates the disposable income each family 
would obtain under the current set of income tax and social welfare policies, and under 
an alternative policy of interest. The results can be tabulated to show the patterns of 
gains and losses over the income distribution, or by family type. The policy change 
under consideration could be a simple change in one tax rate, or a complex programme 
of tax and welfare reform. The model can be used to explore long-term packages of 
reforms, and then examine alternative paths towards the selected long-term objective. 
As well as evaluating possible and actual policy changes, SWITCH can be used to 
examine counterfactual situations, such as the income an unemployed person would 
receive if they became employed, or the income an employed person would receive if 
they became unemployed. 
3.2.1 Constructing a Model Database from SILC 2013 and 2014 
The tax and welfare systems use information on age, marital status, numbers and ages 
of children, incomes from all sources and mortgages in order to determine tax liabilities 
and welfare entitlements. Much of this information is gathered by SILC, as part of the 
process of measuring disposable income – one of the key concepts used in poverty 
measurement. SILC also includes information on housing values which can be used to 
simulate the new Local Property Tax. 
 
Published results from SILC focus mostly on the household and individual levels. For 
tax and welfare purposes, however, there is an intermediate unit - often called the family 
unit or tax unit - which is very relevant for policy purposes. Most tax and welfare 
policies do not operate at the level of the household, though household income and 
household welfare are of key concern to policy. Instead, tax and welfare policies tend 
to operate at either individual level (e.g., contributions to social insurance, and some 
social insurance benefits) or at a family unit level. Detailed information on family and 
household composition is needed to ensure that it is possible to group individuals into 
family units, defined as an individual, together with his or her spouse, and dependent 
children. 
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SILC forms part of a set of harmonized surveys used by Eurostat to analyse issues 
relating to poverty, social inclusion and other issues (Callan et al., 2012b). The income 
concept adopted at European level is measured in annual terms. e.g., total employee 
and self employed income received during the last year etc. As a result, annual incomes 
are the core concern of the Irish implementation of SILC. While there are good reasons 
to be interested in this measure of income, it is not a suitable measure for the purpose 
of simulating welfare entitlements. Welfare entitlements depend in the main on current 
income and labour market status. The CSO’s implementation of SILC therefore goes 
beyond what Europe requires to capture key elements of the current income measure as 
well as annual income. These current income variables are then used within the 
SWITCH model to simulate means-tests within the social welfare system, such as that 
applying to Rent Supplement or the new Housing Assistance Payment. 
 
Further details on the calibration and validation of the SWITCH model, based on SILC 
data, are given in Appendix 3.1. We turn next to issues specific to the modelling of the 
Rent Supplement and the Housing Assistance Payment. 
 
3.2 Rent Supplement in the Pooled 2013 and 2014 SILC sample 
Before outlining the detail of how existing Rent Supplement and new HAP schemes are 
to be modelled in SWITCH, we consider the nature and representativeness of the SILC 
data on which this modelling exercise is built. 
 
The annual statistical report of the Department of Social Protection (DSP, 2014) reports 
national caseload for the Rent Supplement scheme. This is based on a “snapshot” of 
numbers in receipt at 31 December each year.  In the 2014 wave of SILC, information 
is available on whether each respondent received Rent Supplement at any point during 
the previous 12 months, and whether the respondent was currently in receipt of Rent 
Supplement at the time of interview. Current receipt of the payment is most relevant in 
this case, as it gives an estimate of the “snapshot” numbers for SILC which can be 
compared with the official caseload reported by DSP. The 2013 wave of SILC, which 
contributes about 30 per cent of the overall SWITCH database, only records whether 
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an individual has received Rent Supplement at any stage during the previous 12 months. 
To approximate the numbers of respondents in the 2013 wave of SILC that “currently” 
the payment, we exclude those cases where the household is no longer in a private sector 
tenancy, and/or which contain a full-time employee. Such households may have 
qualified for Rent Supplement during the year but could not qualify on a “snapshot” 
basis at the date of interview. There may also be other reasons why a household 
qualified during the year, but no longer qualifies, so the estimate provided is an upper 
bound on the snapshot numbers in the 2013 survey. 
 
The first row of Table 2 shows the number of recipients of Rent Supplement in 2014 
and 2016, as reported by DSP (2014, 2016). The table then compares this figure with 
the number of recipients of Rent Supplement in the pooled 2013/2014 SILC database, 
as well as the number of recipients of Rent Supplement as modelled by SWITCH. The 
weight constructed by the ESRI team designed to represented the 2017 situation (see 
Appendix A for details) controls for the numbers of taxpayers by income group and 
numbers of recipients of a range of other welfare payments.5 Table 3 shows that the use 
of the ESRI weight produces a very similar number of modelled recipients of Rent 
Supplement in SWITCH compared to DSP official statistics, as well as a very similar 
number of actual recipients recorded in SILC compared with DSP statistics.  
 
The comparison of the number of actual recipients in SILC in Table 2 must be 
conducted on a 2014 basis to ensure a valid comparison between SISWS and SILC. 
Pooling the 2014 and 2013 waves of SILC significantly improves the coverage of Rent 
Supplement recipients, compared to a previous version of this report that was based on 
SILC 2010.   
  
                                                 
5 Results throughout the paper are based on the ESRI constructed weight.. 
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Table 2: Estimated Numbers of Recipients of Rent Supplement, Statistical 
Information on Social Welfare Services (SISWS),  SILC and SWITCH  
  
Estimated national 
caseload N of sample cases 
DSP 2014 66,400 n/a 
Pooled SILC 2013/14 62,000 281 
   
DSP 2016  46,300 n/a 
SWITCH, 2017 Policy, 2017 
Incomes 
40,900 303 
Source: Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services, and authors’ calculations using SILC and 
SWITCH. DSP 2016 row excludes 8,700 cases above rent limits. 
 
Using information provided by DSP,6 we can compare the profile of Rent Supplement 
recipients in SILC and in SWITCH with the profile of the full population of recipients 
recorded by DSP. Table 3 shows single individuals represent a smaller proportion of 
Rent Supplement recipients in SILC, compared to DSP records. Conversely, SILC and 
SWITCH have a somewhat higher proportion of two-child families compared to DSP 
statistics from 2014.7  
 
Table 3: Profile of Rent Supplement Recipients – percentage in each family type 
  DSP 2014 
SILC Pooled 
13/14 
Modelled 
2014 
Modelled 
2017 
ESRI Weight  
Single 38.5 29.6 23.2 20.0 
Couple 8.0 7.1 8.7 7.2 
Couple/One Parent Family - 1 Child 20.6 20.5 18.1 21.6 
Couple/One Parent Family - 2 
Children 17.7 22.6 28.7 29.7 
Couple/One Parent Family – 3+ 
Children 15.3 20.3 21.3 21.6 
                                                 
6 We thank Joe Meehan for the information on the Rent Supplement cases by family type. 
7 At the Sept. 2017 meeting of the Interdepartmental HAP Group, it was suggested that the profile of 
Rent Supplement recipients has shifted more towards that modelled by SWITCH in recent years (i.e a 
lower proportion of singles and a higher proportion of couples compared to the DSP 2014 statistics).  
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3.3 Modelling Housing Supports in SWITCH 
Using the income, housing tenure and demographic information in SILC, SWITCH can 
be used to model eligibility for income related housing supports, and the level of 
support each eligible household receives.  
 
3.3.1 Rent Supplement 
Using the tenure status information contained in SILC, we group households into seven 
different tenure categories: owned outright, owned with mortgage, owned under tenant 
purchase scheme, rented at market price, rented below market price, local authority 
tenant, and rent free. Only those renting at or below market price are eligible for Rent 
Supplement (i.e. owner occupiers and those renting from local authorities are not 
eligible). In addition to the tenure status, the detailed income information in SILC 
allows SWITCH to model the means test element of the Rent Supplement. The means 
test takes account of net income from employment (defined as gross income less PRSI), 
as well as most social welfare payment including the Family Income Supplement. As 
per the rules of the Rent Supplement scheme, recipients of Rent Supplement are 
required to pay a minimum contribution towards their rent. Recipients with means, 
subject to the relevant income disregards,8 above the relevant Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance (SWA) rate are required to make a further contribution towards their rent. 
Finally, the maximum rent limits, which place a limit on the rental value of properties 
for which Rent Supplement will generally be paid, are captured using the geographical 
information in SILC.9  
 
                                                 
8 The information in SILC allows the majority of income disregards relevant to the calculation of Rent 
Supplement to be included in SWITCH. SILC does not include the relevant information to model the 
Rehabilitative Earnings Disregard or for the assessment of savings in the Rent Supplement means test, 
so these are features are omitted from the calculation of Rent Supplement in the main analysis.  
9 SWITCH models maximum rent limits at health board level. In practice, maximum rent limits are set 
at county level (excluding Dublin, Wicklow and Kildare who also have some within county variation), 
and local authorities within each county can lower the maximum rent limit at their own discretion. In 
SWITCH, we use the average of the county level maximum rent limits for each health board region.  
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The Rent Supplement means test allows for “reasonable” travel costs to be deducted 
from gross income in assessing an applicant’s means. As SILC does not contain 
information on travel costs, we do not include any travel costs in the means test for Rent 
Supplement. This also ensures that travel costs do not distort the change in financial 
incentives to work reported here as individuals move from Rent Supplement to HAP.10 
3.3.2 Differential Rents  
Under HAP, families’ rent contributions are determined by the same system of 
Differential Rents used to calculate the contributions of local authority tenants. Since 
1986, these have been set at a local authority level, with minimum (and maximum) 
contributions, contribution rates and definitions of assessable income varying across 
authorities. The government committed to reviewing ‘the disparate systems of 
Differential Rents for social housing across local authorities’ in its Rebuilding Ireland 
Action Plan, though at the time of writing this has not been published.   
 
In this report, we examine the effect of replacing Rent Supplement with HAP where 
rent contributions are determined by a hypothetical National Differential Rent (NDR) 
scheme. Table 4 displays the details of the two schemes we consider, based on proposals 
by the Housing Agency (Carroll, 2014). These would both consist of minimum 
contributions (or ‘base charges’, determined by household size and composition) and 
income-related contributions for households with income above a household allowance 
(also determined by household size). 
 
                                                 
10 As a sensitivity test, we included an average value for travel costs of €13 to be deducted from gross 
income when modelling the Rent Supplement; this value was based on previous research by Callan et al. 
(2012a). Little sensitivity was found in the results. 
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Table 4: Differential Rent schemes modelled  
 
Base Charge per week 
  Aged over 26 Aged under 26 
No children Single tenant €30 €17 
Couple tenants €45 €27 
With children Single tenant €30 €30 
Couple tenants €45 €45 
Add - any other adults  €22.50 €13 
Children or full time students 
under 23  €3  
    
Household Allowance per week 
First Adult €268.50 
Additional Adults €191.80 
Children €28.77 
    
Banded Charge (Applies on Income Above Allowance) 
 
Income Band Above 
Allowance, per week Rate 
Band 1 €96 18% 
Band 2 €96 22.5% 
Band 3 €96 25% 
   
High Income Cases: applies on All Income if Income > Allowance + Bands) 
High Income Rate 22% 
  
Source: Carroll (2014) 
 
Under the first NDR scheme considered, households would pay 18 per cent of the first 
€96 per week of income above their household allowance in income-related 
contributions, 22.5 percent of the €96 per week above that, and 25 per cent of the next 
€96 per week. For households with income above this third band, a ‘high income rate’ 
of 22 per cent would apply to their entire income, creating a cliff-edge where rent 
contributions would jump discretely for some households and fall for others, depending 
on the level of their base contributions. The second NDR scheme considered does not 
contain this feature, but rather applies the 25 per cent rate to any income above the third 
band, that is, any income in excess of €192 per week above the household allowance. 
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3.3.3 Housing Assistance Payment 
Modelling of HAP entitlements using SWITCH is carried out in two stages. First, we 
model whether a household is eligible for HAP at all, which requires a family to be on 
their local authority’s housing list. However, as SILC does not contain information on 
this, we consider three alternatives to model eligibility:  
1) Long-term receipt of Rent Supplement  
2) Receipt of Rent Supplement 
3) Renting privately at or below market price  
 
As SILC does not record the length of time individuals have received Rent Supplement, 
we use the duration of receipt of other welfare payments in the household as a proxy to 
model option 1. SILC records the duration of receipt in weekly steps from 1 to 52, 
meaning the maximum duration of receipt we can identify is therefore 52 weeks or 
more. Table 5 shows that using this approach closely mirrors the proportion of long-
term Rent Supplement recipients as of April 2014. 
 
Table 5: Duration of Rent Supplement Receipt – SWITCH v Actual  
Months in Receipt 
of Rent 
Supplement 
  SWITCH  
DSP 2014 2014 policy, wgt17 2017 policy, wgt17 
% (%) (%) 
0 to 6 13.9 12.5 14.2 
6 to 12 14.4 14.1 13 
12+ 71.7 73.4 72.8 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: authors’ calculations and Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services. 
 
While the second option does not require using long-run receipt of other welfare 
benefits as a proxy for HAP eligibility and should capture some individuals with a long-
term housing need who have only recently started claiming another welfare benefit, it 
will also likely overstate the numbers eligible for HAP relative to the government’s 
plans. This is because those who experience a temporary change in circumstances and 
are not deemed to have a social housing need will continue to be eligible for Rent 
Supplement rather than HAP. 
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The third option assumes all those renting privately at or below market price would be 
eligible to receive HAP. While this is a broader role for the payment than is currently 
envisaged by government, it comes close to the role of Housing Benefit in the UK: a 
means-tested support for housing costs available to privately renting low-income 
households (see section 4.4.2 of Hood and Norris Keiller, 2016).  
 
In what follows we use the first of these options to model eligibility for HAP, as this 
most closely approximates the initial scope of HAP. In the second stage, we then model 
the net value of the HAP payment that families receive. This is done by using the rules 
of the Differential Rent schemes outlined in Table 4 to calculate families’ rent 
contributions, with the net-value of HAP received the difference between their actual 
rent and this contribution. 
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Section 4 
Gains, losses and financial work incentives 
 
In this Section we examine the impact of introducing HAP on the incomes and financial 
work incentives of long-term rent supplement claimants. Our focus on this group is 
motivated by the Government’s intention to transfer all long-term rent supplement 
claimants onto HAP. 
 
4.2 Gains and Losses  
Table 6 shows the estimated numbers who would gain and loose from the introduction 
of HAP under the NDR schemes outlined in Section 3. Because the vast majority of 
long-term rent supplement claimants are not in paid work (and so do not have earnings 
high enough for the differences in NDR schemes to apply), the two schemes have the 
same effect on claimants. Just over half of claimants (14,720) would gain by an average 
of €2,084 per year, while two-fifths (11,328) would lose by an average of €568 per 
year.11 The remaining 1,688 claimants would see no change in their income. This 
translates into an average gain of €874 per year, or 3% of disposable income, for long-
run rent supplement claimants, implying an annual cost of just under €25 million 
relative to the current system. Similar estimates suggest that moving all (not just long-
run) rent supplement claimants onto HAP with Differential Rents assessed through 
either NDR scheme would cost close to €40 million per year.12 
 
  
                                                 
11 A straightforward example of where a household can experience a loss of income due to the transfer 
from Rent Supplement is for an unemployed couple with two children. Assuming both members of the 
couple are aged over 27 with no sources of income other than a Jobseeker’s payment, the contribution 
towards rent under Rent Supplement would be €40, whereas under the Differential Rent rules modelled 
in this analysis, their contribution would be €52.  
12 Neither of these costings account for any changes in behaviour that might arise in response to improved 
financial work incentives. 
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Table 2: estimated impact of HAP NDR schemes on disposable income of long-
term rent supplement claimants 
Long-term Rent 
Supplement 
claimants who: 
 
 
  
€ per year N % 
Gain   11,328 53 
   by €2,084  7.8 
Loose  14,720 41 
   by €568  -1.9 
Are unaffected  1,688 6 
Total  27,736 100 
Source: SWITCH, run using pooled 2013-14 SILC data.  
 
 
4.2 Financial Incentives to be in paid work13 
There are two main approaches to the measurement of the incentive to be in paid work. 
The replacement rate (RR) gives an individual’s out-of-work income as a percentage of 
their in work income, and is defined as: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤  
 
For example, an individual whose net weekly income out-of-work was €200 (€100 in 
jobseekers allowance and €100 in HAP), and whose net income in work was €450 (the 
sum of €400 in earnings and €50 in HAP) would have a replacement rate of 44 per cent. 
 
The Participation Tax Rate (PTR) gives the proportion of earnings that are taken away 
in tax or lower benefit entitlements when an individual starts work, that is 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = �1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 � 
                                                 
13 This section draws heavily on the material in Callan et al. (2016).  
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For our example individual, this gives a PTR of 56 per cent.  
 
For both of these measures: 
• Net income means income at the family level after benefits have been added 
and taxes and social security contributions are deducted.14 In all cases, partners’ 
behaviour is assumed to be held constant when calculating an individuals’ 
financial work incentive. 
• Lower numbers indicate stronger financial incentives to work and vice versa.15 
 
Both these measures attempt to capture the incentive to work or not, but they are 
conceptually different. In order to understand this better, consider an equal cash gain in 
each of in-work and out-of-work incomes. This should reduce the attractiveness of 
working compared to not working. On the other hand an increase in the hourly wage 
should increase the financial incentive to work. The replacement rate measure conforms 
to these expectations; but the PTR has different implications: 
 
• An increase in income of a constant Euro amount at all hours (including zero) 
does not change the PTR, but increases the RR. This means that the PTR would 
suggest no change in incentives, but the RR would suggest that they have got 
weaker.  
• At a given level of hours of work, an increase in the gross hourly wage will 
strengthen work incentives according to the RR, but will have ambiguous 
effects according to the PTR.  
 
                                                 
14 Whether family or individual income is more appropriate depends on which is more important for the 
individual’s decisions. For example, a low-earning person living with a high-earning partner may have 
no independent income if he or she does not work, and therefore would have a very low RR – a strong 
financial incentive to work – when calculated using individual income. However, the same individual 
would have a very high RR when calculated using family income, because whether he or she works 
makes little difference proportionally to the family’s income. By contrast, the PTR for this individual is 
likely to be very low (if the individual is only paying income tax and employee PRSI on a small portion 
of their earnings, and is in a family which has an income too great to be entitled to Working Families 
Payment) regardless of whether individual or family income is used for the calculation. 
15 A PTR of 0% would indicate that an individual did not have to pay any tax on their earnings and did 
not lose any benefit entitlement when they started work, whereas a RR of 0% would indicate that an 
individual would not receive any income if they did not work. A PTR or RR of 100% would indicate that 
all of an individual’s earnings would be taken from them in tax or lower benefit entitlements if they 
worked, so they would be no better off working than not. 
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The PTR does, however, have one significant advantage over the RR measure: the PTR 
is driven largely by how the tax and benefit system (rather than potential wages) affects 
the incentive to work. While the RR conflates the incentives caused by taxes and 
earnings power, the PTR distinguishes, to a greater extent, between whether a reduced 
reward to work is caused by higher taxes or lower wages. 
 
Broadly speaking, therefore, the RR measures the absolute strength of financial 
incentives to work whereas the PTR measures the effect of the tax and benefit system 
on work incentives. Both are of interest, and because of this difference in what the two 
measures are describing, much of the empirical analysis that follows will use both 
measures.  
 
For non-workers, an estimate is required of how much they would earn if they did work. 
The approach taken here is to estimate the hourly wage that an individual could 
command, based on characteristics such as age and educational qualifications. We then 
examine how much they would earn at 40 hours per week, as an indicator of their 
potential earnings in full-time work. 16  
 
4.3 Financial Incentives to be in full-time paid work 
We now consider the potential impacts of HAP on the financial incentive long-term 
rent supplement claimants face to be in full-time paid work. Figure 1 shows the 
cumulative distribution of replacement rates for this group under the current system and 
the two NDR schemes we examine. The series plot the proportion of long-term Rent 
Supplement recipients that face a replacement rate of less than that shown on the 
horizontal axis. For example, the black series shows that under the current system, just 
over half of individuals have a replacement rate below 75%.  
 
                                                 
16 See Callan et al. (2016) for more detail on how wages are estimated for non-workers.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of Replacement Rates for long-term Rent 
Supplement recipients under current system and HAP NDR schemes 
 
Source: authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2013-14 SILC data. 
 
The red series show the effect introducing the HAP NDR schemes would have on the 
distribution of replacement rates. Both would significantly strengthen work incentives 
for long-run rent supplement claimants, reducing the share facing a replacement rate in 
excess of 75% from about a half to less than a third. The potential effects are especially 
pronounced where work incentives are currently weakest, with the share facing a 
replacement rate in excess of 90% falling by half (from 10% to 5%) under either HAP 
NDR scheme. 
 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution of PTRs under the current system and the 
two HAP NDR schemes we consider. On this measure, the introduction of either 
scheme would substantially strengthen work incentives for most long-term rent 
supplement claimants, half of whom currently face PTRs in excess of 60%: that is, half 
currently lose at least 60% of what they would earn in employment through taxes and 
withdrawn benefits. Under the HAP NDR schemes, this would fall by between 12 and 
17 percentage points, from half to about a third.  
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of Participation Tax Rates for long-term Rent 
Supplement recipients under current system and HAP NDR schemes 
 
Source: authors’ calculations using SWITCH run on 2013-14 SILC data. 
 
The proportion of individuals facing a PTR of less than 50% would also rise 
substantially, from less than a third under the current system to more than two-fifths 
(40%) under either scheme. The potential effects are again more pronounced where 
work incentives are currently weakest: we estimate that the proportion who keep less 
than 20% of their earnings after taxes and withdrawn benefits (a PTR above 80%) 
would fall from 16% to 6%. 
 
To get a sense of what features are driving these results, we now consider an example 
budget constraint, which plots the disposable income and Rent Supplement or HAP a 
hypothetical single adult paying €200 per week in rent would receive at each hour of 
work (at an hourly wage rate of €10) under the current and proposed systems. Figure 3 
shows that if out of work and claiming jobseekers allowance, this example adult would 
have roughly the same disposable income under HAP and Rent Supplement, as both 
schemes require a minimum contribution of €30 per week. This begins to diverge when 
working more than 12 hours per week as Rent Supplement is withdrawn against other 
sources of income at a faster rate than HAP under the proposed NDR scheme examined 
here: 75% compared to 18% at this income level.   
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Figure 3: budget constraint for single adult  
 
Source: authors’ calculations using SWITCH. Assumes single adult working for €10 per hour with rental 
costs of €200 per week.  
 
At 24 hours per week, this example individual loses their residual entitlement to 
jobseekers allowance under either system, as they are deemed to be working more than 
3 days in 7 (assuming 8 hours of work a day). The drop in other income restores this 
example adult’s full entitlement to both Rent Supplement and HAP, though this is not 
sufficient to offset the drop in jobseekers allowance, resulting in a decline in disposable 
income under both systems. Above this level of hours, the disposable income attained 
under each system again diverges due to the more aggressive means-test of Rent 
Supplement. This is exacerbated by the cliff-edge in Rent Supplement at 30 hours per 
week, which eliminates our example single adult’s entitlement to that payment and 
leaves them financially much better off under HAP when working full-time.  
 
This example neatly illustrates how the proposed HAP NDR scheme can strengthen the 
incentive to be in full-time paid work. Taking disposable income when out-of-work and 
when working 40 hours per week gives a replacement rate (PTR) for this example adult 
of 81% (83%) under the current system of Rent Supplement, much higher than 68% 
(65%) as under the proposed HAP NDR scheme. The key differences between the 
systems that result in these stronger work incentives are the cliff-edge in entitlement to 
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Rent Supplement at 30 hours per week and the much less aggressive means-testing of 
other income under the proposed HAP NDR scheme.  
 
The example also highlights how other aspects of the tax and benefit system are 
important to take into account when analysing the possible effects of changes to the 
design of income-related supports for housing costs. While the cliff-edge in Rent 
Supplement entitlement at 30 hours per week certainly weakens financial incentives to 
work, so too does the requirement that one works no more than 3 days in 7 to be eligible 
for jobseekers allowance. And as the flat segments of the budget constraint in Figure 8 
between 12 and 24 hours per week show, the receipt (and so withdrawal) of multiple 
means-tested benefits (in this case jobseekers allowance and Rent Supplement) can lead 
to very weak incentives to increase earnings or hours at low levels of income.   
 
Indeed, while we find that the proposed HAP NDR scheme would improve financial 
work incentives for most existing long-term Rent Supplement recipients, a small 
minority would continue to face quite a weak incentive to be in full-time paid work in 
part because of the receipt of multiple means-tested benefits. Of the group with a PTR 
or a replacement rate in excess of 70% under the proposed system (one-fifth and two-
fifths of the sample respectively), more than half would also be entitled to jobseekers 
allowance, with another 10% entitled to one-parent family payment. This suggests that 
should policymakers want to further strengthen work incentives for claimants of HAP, 
they may want to consider changes to the wider benefit system, in particular jobseekers 
allowance.     
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Section 5 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined the potential impact of HAP on the financial work incentives 
of long-run Rent Supplement claimants. We found that if transferred onto the new 
housing support with rent contributions calculated under the National Differential Rents 
scheme proposed by Carroll (2014), HAP will on average improve work incentives, and 
lead to fewer individuals facing extremely high replacement rates and participation tax 
rates. Effects are particularly pronounced where work incentives are currently weakest. 
 
However, caution should be taken in inferring anything about the magnitude or 
extent of likely employment responses to this change. Firstly, there is limited evidence 
on the responsiveness to financial incentives of the affected group. Current long-term 
claimants of Rent Supplement include some lone parents (who we know from the 
international literature to be relatively responsive to financial incentives) but also many 
married and single men (on whom evidence is more mixed).17 Second, many of those 
who see improvements to their financial work incentives have been out of the labour 
market for a substantial period of time, and may face difficulties in re-entering even 
though it is financially beneficial to do so.18 And finally, while it was originally 
proposed that HAP be rolled out in conjunction with a National Differential Rent 
scheme along the lines examined in this paper, such a scheme has yet to be progressed. 
The rental contributions of HAP recipients are instead currently determined by the 
Differential Rents scheme operated by their local authority. These differ in terms of 
minimum (and maximum) contributions, definitions of means-testable income, and the 
rate at which contributions increase with this income. As a result, the actual effects of 
HAP on financial work incentives may differ significantly from those described here, 
and will vary across local authorities. 
                                                 
17 For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Blundell and Macurdy (2011), Keane (2011) and 
Meghir and Phillips (2011). Bargain et al. (2014) provide one of the few estimates of own-wage labour 
supply elasticities by gender and income level in Ireland, and suggest that low-income single men may 
be particularly responsive to financial incentives by international standards.  
18 This could be because of the depreciation of general human capital (Pissarides, 1992), psychologically 
discouragement (Clark et al 2001), and poorer worker-firm match quality (Liu et al, 2016). 
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Appendix A: Calibration and Validation of SWITCH 
The weighting procedures used by the CSO help to ensure that SILC is broadly 
representative of the Irish household population in terms of key demographics (age 
group, sex, household composition and region). There is, however, no guarantee that 
this set of controls will ensure that the survey data represent the social welfare client 
population and/or the income tax base. These are key requirements for a tax-benefit 
model: the value added by the model will be greatly enhanced if the input database 
provides a good representation of the welfare client population and the income tax base. 
 
For this reason, and as discussed in Callan et al. (2012b), an adjusted weight to the 
initial weight provided by the CSO is used commonly used for SWITCH analysis. The 
CSO weighting procedure used to create household cross-sectional weights begins with 
household design weights, which are in inverse proportion to the probability of 
selection. A further adjustment is made to take account of non-response among 
longitudinal households. Benchmark information or “control totals” are then used to 
estimate weights which gross up the data to population estimates. Broadly speaking, 
the weighting estimates are derived finding the smallest adjustment to the weights 
which ensures that the weighted estimates reproduce the control totals or 
“benchmarks”. The control totals or benchmarks used by CSO are: 
 
• population estimates by sex and age group (0-14, 15-34, 35-64, 65 and over). 
These are based on population projections, which draw on Census data. 
• Household population estimates at regional level using the eight NUTS3 
regions. These are generated from the Quarterly National Household Survey 
(QNHS) 
• Household composition controls (6 categories, depending on numbers of adults 
and numbers of children) which are also drawn from the QNHS. 
 
These controls help to ensure that SILC is broadly representative of the Irish household 
population in terms of key demographics (age group, sex, household composition and 
region).  
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The SWITCH model, however, requires an accurate and representative representation 
of the income tax paying and social welfare receiving population. There is no guarantee 
that the set of initial controls used will ensure this. Without such controls a tax benefit 
model may fail to accurately capture the total cost/savings to the exchequer of policy 
changes or the impact policy changes have on income distribution and poverty rates. 
For this reason SWITCH requires additional controls. Essentially the procedure used is 
the same as that employed by CSO in constructing the benchmark weights. The 
difference is that some additional control totals are used, chief among these being 
control totals or benchmarks relating to the distribution of income taxpayers by income 
band as well as estimates of the social welfare population. Similar approaches have 
been employed for many years in UK tax-benefit models (Atkinson et al., 1988) and in 
Germany (Merz, 1991). The CSO benchmark weights are treated as the initial weights 
in our procedure, and new weights are estimated using the CALMAR software, which 
gross up the population both to the new control totals, and to the controls applied by 
CSO. Different weights are used for each year of analysis, so that the SILC 2013/2014 
data can be reweighted to be representative, along the lines discussed, of the 2017 
population.  
 
We now focus on the representativeness of the underlying data and the model. Table  
shows the estimated numbers of social welfare recipients by major scheme type, 
comparing the numbers modelled by SWITCH to the figures reported by the 
Department of Social Protection. The first column of figures shows the number of 
recipients by scheme as provided by the Department of Social Protection. These figures 
are based on a projection for the numbers in receipt of benefit at a certain point in time, 
specifically at the 31st December 2017. The SWITCH figures refer to the number of 
people who are modelled to receive the payments based on the information provided in 
SILC. The figures are therefore not directly comparable with the end- December figures 
from DSP, as the SILC interviews take place throughout the year. While there are some 
payments with a seasonal element (e.g., back to school, Christmas bonus and fuel 
allowance) these do not have a major impact on the comparison. Trends in 
unemployment have the potential to make a more serious impact.  
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Table A1: Numbers of Recipients (000s) by Social Welfare Scheme 
Social welfare 
payment type* 
DSP 
Projections 
2017 
SWITCH 
2017  
(eurwgt_s) 
SWITCH 
2017 
(Wgt17) 
SWITCH 
(eurwgt_s) 
as % of DSP 
SWITCH 
(wgt17) as 
% of DSP 
State Contrib & 
Non-Contrib 
Pensions  406 406 418 100% 103% 
Widows, Widowers 
and  
One-Parent Families 174 147 172 85% 99% 
Jobseekers 
Supports 253 393 214 155% 84% 
Illness, Disability 
and Caring 325 293 277 90% 85% 
*2017 figures for State Contributory and Non-Contributory Pensions are adjusted using 
Census estimates of the proportion of the over 65 age group living in non-household 
situations (mainly nursing homes).  2017 figures for State Contributory Pensions also 
exclude recipients living outside the state 
 
The figures are presented using the CSO weight (euroweight_s) as well as the new 
adjusted weight for 2017 (wgt17). We can see that, overall, SWITCH captures the social 
welfare population well, particularly for the pension schemes and one-parent family 
scheme, with ratios close to 100 per cent. The working age income supports, and 
illness/disability support schemes have coverage levels of about 85 per cent.  The CSO 
weight, euroweight_s, also provides good coverage of the social welfare population, 
though there is a strong over-representation of jobseeker support payments. Given the 
CSO weight reweights the population to be representative of the survey year, in this 
2013 and 2014 when unemployment was considerably higher than forecast for 2017, 
this result is largely unsurprising.  
 
Given that our procedure involves re-applying the control totals from the CSO 
benchmarks, results on these social welfare domains tend to be similar. However there 
are substantial differences in terms of the implications of the alternative weighting 
choices for the analysis of tax policy. Table  reports costings of tax policy changes from 
the Department of Finance/Revenue pre-Budget 2017 “Ready Reckoner”. These are 
compared with two costings based on SWITCH: one using SILC with the CSO’s 
benchmark weight (‘euroweight_s’), and the other using SILC with the adjusted 
weights involving calibration to the income distribution among taxpayers and social 
 -29- 
 
welfare population. It is clear that when the CSO’s benchmark weights are used, the 
costs of tax policy changes are substantially underestimated – “coverage” of the cost 
ranging from 60 per cent to 88 per cent for the majority of costings. Using the adjusted 
weights, on the other hand, the costs are well represented, with the “coverage ratio” for 
the costings usually varying between 90 and 115 per cent. 
 
Table A2: Costing of Tax Policy Changes 
  
Ready 
Reckoner 
2017 
SWITCH 2017  
 Eurwgt_s 
SWITCH 2017 
- wgt17 
SWITCH 
(Eurwgt _s) as 
% of Ready 
Reck. 
SWITCH 
(wgt17) as % 
of Ready Reck. 
Personal tax credit 
+€100  217 186 242 86% 111% 
PAYE tax credit 
+€50 80 62 86 77% 108% 
Lone Parent tax 
credit +€100 3.7 3 6 88% 175% 
Tax Band +€100 18 15 21 85% 115% 
Tax Band +€500 95 76 103 80% 108% 
Tax Band +€1000 178 151 204 85% 115% 
Standard income 
tax rate -1% 576 457 621 79% 108% 
Top income tax 
rate -1% 283 195 262 69% 92% 
USC: 1 percentage 
point decrease in:      
0.5% rate* 124 182 125 147% 101% 
2.5% rate  159 96 131 60% 82% 
5% rate 367 290 361 79% 98% 
*Reduced to 0%      
Ready Reckoner Prepared by Statistics & Economic Research Branch, Revenue Commissioners, 
Nov. 2016 
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Appendix B: Rent Supplement: Simulation and Receipt 
Tables B1 and B2 analyse whether the households that are reported to have received 
Rent Supplement in SILC are the same households that are modelled as entitled to 
receive Rent Supplement in SWITCH. This comparison is done using the 2014 policy 
rules and income levels in SWITCH, to ensure a valid comparison between SILC and 
SWITCH. As receipt of Rent Supplement is annual in the 2013 data, cases that report 
receipt of Rent Supplement that also report that they own their home (with or without 
a mortgage), or that they work more than 30 hours a week are assumed not to be in 
“current “ receipt of Rent Supplement in the 2013 wave of SILC. Of those who are 
modelled as entitled to receive Rent Supplement in SWITCH, approximately one-third 
also report that they receive the payment in SILC. The cases that are modelled to receive 
Rent Supplement in SWITCH that do not report receipt of Rent Supplement in SILC 
are due to factors such as non-take-up and temporarily low income in households. 
 
There are a substantial number of cases that report receipt of Rent Supplement in SILC 
who are not modelled as entitled to receive the payment in SWITCH. A number of 
factors may cause this. As previously discussed, the annual figure in SILC may be up 
to 25 per cent higher than the current number of recipients modelled by SWITCH due 
to short-term receipt of the benefit, so a number of cases that report receipt in 2013 may 
not be in current receipt of the payment even after removing those in full-time work 
and those that own their property. Therefore, a large proportion of these cases may have 
been in short term receipt of the benefit at some point over the year of survey, but no 
longer qualify for the payment.  
 
However, Rent Supplement receipt recorded in the 2014 wave of SILC, for the majority 
of cases, comes from DSP administrative records. Again, a number of factors can 
contribute to the high degree of non-overlap between SWITCH and SILC Rent 
Supplement recipients. While the rules of Rent Supplement have been strictly modelled 
in SWITCH as closely as possible to reality with available data, some discrepancies 
exist. For example, in SWITCH no recipient can work more than 30 hours, while in 
reality there are certain exceptions to this, such as RAS eligible households. In addition, 
some discretion exists to the application of maximum rent limits, which again can result 
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in differences between SWITCH modelling of the scheme and how it is implemented 
in reality. The comparison of the family type distribution of Rent Supplement recipients 
discussed in the main text suggests that both the actual and modelled population of Rent 
Supplement recipients used in this analysis is representative of the true population of 
recipients.  
 
Table B1: Cross Tabulation of Actual Rent Supplement Recipients in SILC and 
Modelled Rent Supplement recipients in SWITCH 
 Modelled  
(SWITCH, 2014 Policy, euroweight) 
 
Actual  
(SILC 2014/2013 
RMF) 
Not in Receipt In Receipt Total 
Not in Receipt  33,670 33,670 
In Receipt 45,590 16,076 61,666 
Total 45,590 49,746   
Note: Actual Recipients of Rent Supplement in SILC 2013 who report owning their house, 
having a mortgage, or working more than 30 hours a week are excluded from this table. 
 
 
Table B2: Cross Tabulation of Actual Rent Supplement Recipients in SILC and 
Modelled Rent Supplement recipients in SWITCH 
 Modelled  
(SWITCH, 2014 Policy, wgt17) 
 
Actual  
(SILC 2014/2013 
RMF) 
Not in Receipt In Receipt Total 
Not in Receipt  18,861 18,861 
In Receipt 27,385 9,071 36,457 
Total 27,385 27,932   
Note: Actual Recipients of Rent Supplement in SILC 2013 who report owning their house, 
having a mortgage, or working more than 30 hours a week are excluded from this table. 
 
 
 
Year Number Title/Author(s) 
2019   
 609 Predicting farms’ noncompliance with regulations on 
nitrate pollution 
Pete Lunn, Seán Lyons and Martin Murphy 
2018   
 608 How openness to trade rescued the Irish economy 
Kieran McQuinn, Petros Varthalitis 
 607 Senior cycle review: Analysis of discussion in schools on 
the purpose of senior cycle education in Ireland 
Joanne Banks, Selina McCoy, Emer Smyth 
 606 LNG and gas storage optimisation and valuation: 
Lessons from the integrated Irish and UK markets 
Mel T. Devine, Marianna Russo 
 605 The profitability of energy storage in European 
electricity markets 
Petr Spodniak, Valentin Bertsch, Mel Devine 
 604 The framing of options for retirement: Experimental 
tests for policy 
Féidhlim McGowan, Pete Lunn, Deirdre Robertson 
 603 The impacts of demand response participation in 
capacity markets 
Muireann Á. Lynch, Sheila Nolan, Mel T. Devine, Mark 
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